← Kalsmritikosh

Verify a conformance bundle

When someone hands you a Kalsmritikosh conformance bundle — a plain folder exported from an approved findings run — you can verify it yourself, on any Mac, without installing Kalsmritikosh and without trusting the person who sent it.

1 · Get the verifier

The standalone verifier is a single open-source Swift file (Foundation + CryptoKit only). It is generated from the app's own conformance source — the rule compiler, every evaluator, the fail-closed rollup and the seal envelope are the application's files concatenated verbatim (see scripts/generate-kalverify.sh), and CI fails if the published verifier ever drifts from the app. What you rerun is what the app ran.

curl -LO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sasmalgiri/kalsmritikosh/main/verifier/kalverify.swift

2 · Verify

swift kalverify.swift /path/to/bundle-folder

Three separated verdicts print — never a single blended "genuine":

INTEGRITY

Every file matches the manifest's SHA-256. Detects edits, truncation, missing files.

AUTHENTICITY

The ECDSA P-256 signature over the canonical envelope verifies, and the signed hashes match the actual protocol, evaluations, facts and evidence-manifest bytes. Editing content and recomputing hashes still fails here.

REPLAY

The verifier recompiles the rules from the frozen protocol and reruns every evaluator over the recorded facts — with the app's own compiler and evaluator code, so a wrongly computed outcome fails even when it was correctly signed. Every rule field (severity, waivability, evidence requirements, applicability) is compared, and the run binding is recomputed from the signed facts. The certificate separates machine-observed phases from asserted ones on its face. Deleting the facts to force a weaker check also fails: the facts hash is signed.

3 · Bind the signer's identity

Without a known fingerprint, AUTHENTICITY proves key-consistency only — anyone can sign with a fresh key. To bind identity, pass the signer's published fingerprint:

swift kalverify.swift /path/to/bundle-folder <signer-fingerprint>

The official Kalsmritikosh developer signing fingerprint:

f760b04ce2d5030c

Individuals and organizations publish their own fingerprints (Kalsmritikosh → Compliance Board → “Copy my signer fingerprint”).

What a passing bundle proves — and what it doesn't

Proves: this exact per-rule assessment, against this exact frozen SOP version, produced these outcomes, was signed by the holder of that key, and the signed evidence-bearing contents have not changed since. Does not prove: which human ran it, that the underlying evidence is truthful, or compliance with any law or regulation — conformance to the encoded procedure is a property of the software record, not a legal certification.

Format specification

The full contract — file layout, canonicalization rules, envelope fields, verdict algorithms, portable evaluator semantics — is published as BUNDLE_FORMAT.md, so independent implementations can verify identically.

Studio deliverables

Every studio report that leaves the app (copy/print/export) carries a signed deliverable seal — and when a Mac cannot sign, the report says UNSEALED on its face instead of pretending. Verify one with the same tool:

swift kalverify.swift --studio /path/to/sealed-report.md

Bundles from strict-mode approvals also export the public audit trail (audit-events.json, event metadata only) — the verifier replays a keyless SHA-256 chain over it to the head signed in the envelope. Each link binds the event's sequence, source, ID, time and payload, so trail metadata cannot be edited either.

Kalsmritikosh runs 100% on-device and makes no network connections; bundles contain rule outcomes and hashes, never your source documents.